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THE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S PIN: UNTANGLING FREE 
SPEECH REGULATION IN THE COURTROOM 
Michael Kagan* 
I. A FIRST AMENDMENT FAULT LINE 
On a Tuesday morning in September 2016, Erika Ballou, a deputy 
public defender in Clark County, Nevada, appeared with her client for a 
sentencing hearing in a Las Vegas courtroom.1 She wore a black pin on her 
lapel. “Black Lives Matter,” it said.2 District Court Judge Douglas Herndon 
told her to either take it off or hand her case over to another attorney from 
the public defender’s office.3 Ballou refused and asked the judge to instead 
recuse himself from her cases. Her boss, Clark County Public Defender 
Phil Kohn, stood at her side and insisted she should be allowed to wear the 
pin.4 
A few days earlier, the Las Vegas Police Protective Association, the 
main police union in the city, had written a letter to the chief judge of the 
district court complaining about defense attorneys wearing the pin in court.5 
Judge Herndon, who had been endorsed by the police union during his 
election campaigns,6 said that he was simply asking that attorneys “leave 
any kind of political or opinion protest statements outside the 
courtroom. . . . Wear it in the hallway. Wear it in front of the courthouse.”7 
Ms. Ballou insisted that she was acting within her First Amendment 
rights and argued that she was unfairly being treated differently from Clark 
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1 See Ken Ritter, Defense Attorney Sparks ‘Black Lives’ Protest in Vegas Court, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Sept. 20. 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/f0812b206ffa4385ae31da44f05e7281/defense-
attorney-sparks-black-lives-protest-vegas-court [https://perma.cc/5JS2-Q3LS]. A video of the court 
hearing is available. David Ferrara & Wesley Juhl, ‘Black Lives Matter’ Support Swells Among Las 
Vegas Defense Attorneys, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Sept. 21, 2016, 9:23 PM), 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/black-lives-matter-support-swells-among-las-vegas-
defense-attorneys [https://perma.cc/NWW2-MZMS]. 
2 Ritter, supra note 1. 
3 Ferrara & Juhl, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 Wesley Juhl & David Ferrara, Controversy Over Defense Lawyer’s Black Lives Matter Pin 
Delays Hearing, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Sept. 20, 2016, 11:47 AM), 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/controversy-over-defense-lawyer-s-black-lives-matter-
pin-delays-hearing [https://perma.cc/3PLT-YBUS]. 
6 See Voter Guide: Douglas W. Herndon, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/voter-guide/candidates/douglas-w-herndon (last visited Feb. 8, 2016) 
(presenting candidate-submitted information) [https://perma.cc/R79E-APAS]. 
7 Ritter, supra note 1. 
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County prosecutors—who wear office-issued lapel pins—and uniformed 
court marshals, who had been allowed to wear black bands commemorating 
police killed in the line of duty.8 Judge Herndon adjourned the sentencing 
hearing. Two days later, they reconvened. Ms. Ballou agreed to remove her 
pin. Instead, she wore a black arm band, and was flanked by nearly two 
dozen colleagues who wore both the arm bands and Black Lives Matter 
pins.9 
Ms. Ballou was not the first. Earlier in 2016, Ohio defense attorney 
Andrea Burton settled a contempt of court case against her that began when 
she wore a Black Lives Matter pin to court.10 She told journalists that, as 
part of the settlement, she agreed not to wear the pin inside the courtroom 
on the condition that police be prohibited from wearing black bands on 
their badges commemorating slain officers.11 In that case, the judge told a 
television reporter, “[t]here’s a difference between a flag, a pin from your 
church or the Eagles and having a pin that’s on a political issue.”12 
The Black Lives Matter pin cases expose a fault line in First 
Amendment law. The Supreme Court has never fully resolved the question 
of whether speech in court is free speech for First Amendment purposes. 
The Court has found that lawyers may advertise their services to the public, 
subject to reasonable regulation.13 And the Court has found that lawyers 
enjoy constitutional protection for out-of-court political speech critical of 
the legal system.14 But these cases did not deal directly with attorney 
expression in the courtroom. Some lower courts have rejected claims that 
lawyers’ communications in the courtroom enjoy any First Amendment 
protection at all.15 But their reasoning has been muddled, and the judges 
have been divided. It is not clear how they would treat the specific facts 
that arose in Las Vegas. 
In this brief Essay, I outline the reasons why free speech in the 
courtroom remains somewhat uncharted territory in First Amendment law. 
Using the Las Vegas Black Lives Matter pin case as an example, I argue 
for a way to resolve the inherent tension between free speech and the need 
to maintain order and fairness in the court. Under my proposed solution, 
judges would be able to impose certain limitations on courtroom speech but 
could not engage in viewpoint discrimination. Judges should be especially 
cautious about imposing special restrictions on speech that they regard as 
 
8 Id. 
9 David Ferrara, Lawyers Pack Courtroom in Support of ‘Black Lives Matter’ Movement, LAS 
VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Sept. 22, 2016, 12:10 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-
vegas/lawyers-pack-courtroom-support-black-lives-matter-movement [https://perma.cc/9PB9-Z73L]. 
10 Associated Press, Las Vegas Lawyers Plan to Defy Judge, Wear Black Lives Matter Pin, CBS 
NEWS (Sept. 21, 2016, 10:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/las-vegas-lawyers-plan-to-defy-
judge-wear-black-lives-matter-pins/ [https://perma.cc/94C8-YJCC]. 
11 Id. 
12 See Amanda Smith, Atty. Refuses to Remove Black Lives Matter Pin, Taken into Custody, 
WKBN (July 22, 2016, 11:49 AM), http://wkbn.com/2016/07/22/attorney-jailed-for-refusing-to-take-
off-black-lives-matter-button/ (including video) [https://perma.cc/8EVL-4M3W]. 
13 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) [https://perma.cc/9AUA-M7P2]. 
14 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1032–33 (1991) [https://perma.cc/X48C-S2VR]. 
15 See infra notes 28–63 and accompanying text. 
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more controversial. Instead, judges who are concerned about extraneous 
expression in their courtroom need to hew carefully to a neutral approach, 
applicable to controversial symbols as well as seemingly innocuous speech. 
II. THE TROUBLE WITH SPEECH IN THE COURTROOM 
Perhaps the most famous Supreme Court case involving free speech in 
a courthouse is Cohen v. California.16 In that 1971 case, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutional right of Paul Robert Cohen to wear “a jacket 
bearing the words ‘Fuck the Draft’” in the corridor outside of a 
courtroom.17 But while this free expression occurred in a courthouse, it did 
not force the Court to address judges’ authority to restrict speech inside the 
courtroom. Moreover, the Supreme Court refused to treat Mr. Cohen’s case 
as a question of courthouse decorum because he was punished under a 
broad statute that was applicable everywhere in California.18 
The only direct guidance that the Supreme Court has offered about 
courtroom speech came in another case that, like Ms. Ballou’s, originated 
in Las Vegas. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, a 1991 case about lawyer 
free speech, the Supreme Court found that an attorney could not be 
sanctioned for publicly criticizing misconduct within the criminal justice 
system.19 But the lawyer in that case made his critical statements at a press 
conference a few hours after his client was indicted.20 Like Mr. Cohen, he 
did not make the statements in the courtroom. However, the Gentile Court 
did say, in dicta, that “in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, 
whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely 
circumscribed.”21 Therein lies the problem. Does “extremely 
circumscribed” mean that an attorney has no free speech rights in court at 
all? Or does it mean that a careful balance must be struck? 
Other than the brief dicta in Gentile, the Supreme Court has never 
clearly explained how we should think about the courtroom as a context for 
speech. This is a problem because modern free speech law has become 
extensively focused on categorizing the nature of the forum in which 
speech occurs in order to determine if and how government may regulate 
it.22 The Supreme Court has created three main categories of forums for 
 
16 403 U.S. 15 (1971) [https://perma.cc/43LP-62QK]. 
17 Id. at 16 (quoting the decision of the California Court of Appeals, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1969)). 
18 Id. at 19. 
19 501 U.S. at 1034–35 (“There is no question that speech critical of the exercise of the State’s 
power lies at the very center of the First Amendment. Nevada seeks to punish the dissemination of 
information relating to alleged governmental misconduct . . . . The judicial system, and in particular our 
criminal justice courts, play a vital part in a democratic state, and the public has a legitimate interest in 
their operations.”). 
20 Id. at 1033. 
21 Id. at 1071. 
22 See Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 647, 652 
(2010) (“With so much hinging on the label, litigation routinely arises over whether a court should 
deem a particular location a public forum (where only content-neutral time, place, and manner 
restrictions are allowed) or a nonpublic forum (where a vast array of restrictions are allowed if they are 
viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum).” (footnote omitted)); Robert C. 
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free speech purposes: the public forum, the nonpublic forum, and the 
limited public forum, with the most confusion surrounding the limited 
public forum.23 
In very brief terms, free speech rights are at their apex in a traditional 
public forum, of which the National Mall is the ideal type.24 By contrast, 
the government has more latitude to restrict speech in nonpublic fora, 
including on government property.25 An obvious example would be a 
government office building, where public employees are supposed to 
conduct the regular work of government agencies. If protestors enter, say, a 
veterans’ hospital and begin to shout slogans, the First Amendment does 
not prevent an official from ordering them to stop and forcibly removing 
them if necessary. Protestors could of course picket outside on the 
sidewalk, but they do not have a constitutional right to speak inside. This 
seems to be the logic behind Judge Herndon’s statement that the pin could 
be worn in the hallway or outside the court, but not inside the court 
hearing. 
Yet, a court is not entirely closed to the public the way some 
government offices are. It might be closer to the third category, the limited 
public fora. The Court has explained that a limited public forum is 
“reserv[ed] . . . for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”26 
Consider, for illustration, a public municipal board meeting. In this context, 
government officials can restrict speech quite a bit, for instance by only 
allowing public comment at a designated time and requiring speakers to 
limit their statements in duration. Such rules are necessary to allow public 
bodies to function. But it would be considerably different if, say, a school 
board only allowed public comment from people who favored a particular 
bond issue or property tax increase. The Supreme Court has addressed this 
problem by holding that in limited public fora, authorities can regulate the 
form and subject matter of speech, but may not discriminate based on 
viewpoint: 
Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to 
address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum, or if he is 
not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum 
was created, the government violates the First Amendment when it denies 
 
Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA 
L. REV. 1713, 1731–44 (1987) (tracing the development of the Court’s distinction between public and 
nonpublic fora). 
23 See Caplan, supra note 22, at 654 (discussing the Court’s shifting use of the term). The 
taxonomy can become more complicated, because a public forum can come in at least two varieties. It 
can be a “traditional public forum,” which has traditionally been held in trust for public use, or it can be 
a “designated public forum” that the government intentionally opens for that purpose even if it is not 
traditionally considered to be a public forum. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015) [https://perma.cc/6JJV-8XU7]. 
24 ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) [https://perma.cc/BA2D-J5LJ]. 
25 See Caplan, supra note 22, at 651. 
26 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (alteration in original) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) [https://perma.cc/YGS7-YE6M]). 
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access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an 
otherwise includible subject.27 
This principle of viewpoint neutrality would seem to support Ballou’s 
argument that if police can wear arm bands commemorating violence 
against police while they are in a courtroom, she ought to be able wear a 
pin protesting violence by police against people of color. 
III. LOWER COURT RESISTANCE 
At least three federal circuits have rejected claims that lawyers’ 
expression in the courtroom enjoys First Amendment protection. Two of 
these cases produced split decisions, and the colorful circumstances of each 
case help illustrate why judges may be troubled by lawyers’ courtroom 
expression. 
A. Berner v. Delahanty 
Of these three cases, one seems especially similar to Erika Ballou’s 
dispute with Judge Herndon because it also involved a button. In Berner v. 
Delahanty, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered the case of 
a Maine lawyer, Seth Berner, who in late October 1995 appeared in Judge 
Thomas Delahanty’s courtroom wearing a button opposing an anti-LGBT 
initiative on the Maine ballot.28 His button said, “No on 1—Maine Won’t 
Discriminate.”29 Judge Delahanty told him to remove it because “the 
courtroom is not a political forum.”30 The First Circuit unanimously agreed: 
A courtroom’s very function is to provide a locus in which civil and criminal 
disputes can be adjudicated. . . . 
. . . Emblems of political significance worn by attorneys in the courtroom as 
a means of espousing personal political opinions can reasonably be thought 
to compromise the environment of impartiality and fairness to which every 
jurist aspires. As an officer of the court, a lawyer’s injection of private 
political viewpoints into the courtroom, coupled with the judge’s toleration 
of such conduct, necessarily tarnishes the veneer of political imperviousness 
that ideally should cloak a courtroom, especially when the partisan 
sentiments are completely unrelated to the court’s business.31 
The First Circuit reasoned that a lawyer compromises a courtroom’s 
“cloak” of impartiality by injecting political speech into a proceeding. But 
is the problem that Mr. Berner’s button was “political,” or that it was 
“completely unrelated” to court business? It seems to me that the latter 
better justifies the First Circuit’s decision, and might explain the court’s 
 
27 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (citations omitted) 
[https://perma.cc/24YB-T6MM]; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (calling viewpoint 
discrimination “an egregious form of content discrimination” from which the government is forbidden 
“even when the limited public forum is one of its own creation”). 
28 129 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1997) [https://perma.cc/48EK-3672]. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 26–27. 
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unanimity.32 Telling him to remove the button was arguably little different 
from telling someone in the audience to be quiet, or telling a lawyer to not 
discuss irrelevancies in an argument. 
Despite her case’s superficial similarity to Mr. Berner’s, Ms. Ballou 
advanced three means of differentiating her speech from Mr. Berner’s. She 
told Judge Herndon that her pin was not supporting or opposing a candidate 
on the ballot (nor a ballot measure, for that matter).33 She argued that 
“Black Lives Matter” referred to “an issue about criminal justice.”34 And, 
most importantly, she pointed to the fact that police are permitted to wear 
symbolic bands in court to suggest that her pin was being singled out for its 
particular message.35 In other words, she asserted the judge’s ruling 
amounted to viewpoint discrimination. These are rebuttable points, to be 
sure. A lawyer in a sentencing hearing does not necessarily have the 
latitude to raise any issue that can be related in some manner to criminal 
justice. Moreover, even if the content of the speech is permissible, a rule of 
order might require lawyers to make their arguments on the record, rather 
than through visual signs, symbols, and the like. But once a judge allows 
some symbolic visual expression in speech, it becomes much harder to 
justify restricting others. 
B. Zal v. Steppe 
In 1992, a Ninth Circuit panel issued a split decision on a case 
involving Cyrus Zal, an antiabortion lawyer from California. Zal had defied 
a ban on talking about abortion during a trial of a pro-life protestor.36 The 
trial judge ordered Zal to avoid using a list of fifty words and phrases, such 
as “killing centers,” “infanticide,” “fetus,” “abortion,” and 
“extermination.”37 Zal disregarded the banned word list repeatedly, and by 
the end of the trial the judge had cited him for contempt twenty times.38 Zal 
cited the First Amendment in his defense.39 
Two of the three judges on the appellate panel, Judge Farris and Judge 
Trott, rejected Zal’s First Amendment challenge outright.40 They relied on 
the dicta from Gentile and an older Supreme Court case stating that, when a 
lawyer disagrees with a trial judge’s decision, he may preserve the issue for 
appeal but may not otherwise disrupt the court or resist the judge’s 
authority.41 In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Noonan noted 
that the Supreme Court had previously struck down a contempt citation for 
 
32 Id. at 22. 
33 See Ritter, supra note 1. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1992) [https://perma.cc/9DQ4-3P94]. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 926. 
39 Id. at 927. 
40 Id.; id. at 930 (Trott, J., concurring). 
41 Id. at 927–28 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991); Sacher v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1952) [https://perma.cc/45B5-8ETR]). 
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inflamed language used by a pro se defendant.42 Judge Noonan thought that 
this meant that trial judges must grant “broad latitude” for abusive language 
in court.43 He wrote that “[i]t would be ironic if the Constitution failed to 
protect its professional defenders—the lawyers—in the very forum 
dedicated to the Constitution’s doctrine.”44 Judge Noonan quoted an earlier 
Ninth Circuit decision where the court of appeals said, “attorneys and other 
trial participants do not lose their constitutional rights at the courthouse 
door.”45 But despite that broad phraseology, that prior case dealt with 
restrictions on attorneys talking to the media, rather than on speech in the 
courtroom.46 
In response, Judge Trott insisted that the First Amendment did not 
apply at all in courtrooms because they are not public fora.47 He thought 
that to bring the First Amendment into the courtroom would essentially 
turn judicial order into chaos: 
Does a juror have a First Amendment right to speak or to examine 
witnesses? Does a court reporter have a right to editorialize during closing 
arguments? May spectators chafe, chant, and cheer? Could an anti-abortion 
advocate appear and deliver a right-to-life speech to the jury about to 
deliberate on the charges against Zal’s clients? I would think not.48 
Like the First Circuit, Judge Trott worried about extending First 
Amendment protection to courtroom settings. But the dicta in Gentile may 
not go quite to the extreme position that Judge Trott articulated. Gentile 
explicitly states that free speech in the courtroom is “circumscribed,” but it 
does not say it is nonexistent.49 Judge Trott missed the point when he said, 
“[a]lthough courtrooms have always been devoted to debate, they have 
never been devoted to free debate, but only to debate within the confines 
set by the trial judge and the rule of law.”50 The answer is not to dismiss the 
idea that the First Amendment applies to courtrooms, but to focus on how 
to apply it in a way that protects decorum and prevents viewpoint 
discrimination. 
C. Mezibov v. Allen 
The third relevant court of appeals case involved Marc D. Mezibov, a 
criminal defense attorney in Ohio, and his dispute with a local prosecutor, 
Michael K. Allen.51 During a criminal trial, Mezibov made multiple 
 
42 Id. at 935 (Noonan, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part) (citing In re Little, 
404 U.S. 553 (1972) (per curiam) [https://perma.cc/4NV2-ML83]). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 934–35. 
45 Id. at 934 (quoting Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th 
Cir. 1985) [https://perma.cc/YN8X-WFF5]). 
46 Levine, 764 F.2d at 592. 
47 Zal, 968 F.2d at 932 (Trott, J., concurring) (“Traditional First Amendment analysis also supports 
the idea that lawyers (and others) have no First Amendment right to speak freely in a courtroom.”). 
48 Id. 
49 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991). 
50 Zal, 968 F.2d at 932 (Trott, J., concurring). 
51 Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 715 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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motions to have Allen disqualified from the case, which the trial judge 
rejected.52 Mezibov’s client was ultimately convicted, after which Allen 
told the local press that Mezibov “is a man who doesn’t try too many cases 
and the verdict shows that. If I were [the defendant], I would ask for my 
money back.”53 Mezibov responded by filing a Section 198354 suit against 
Allen, alleging that he had defamed him under color of law in retaliation 
for filing motions in court.55 In support of his argument that Allen was 
using the power of the state to retaliate against him for protected speech in 
court, he cited the Ninth Circuit’s “courthouse door” line that Judge 
Noonan also echoed.56 
In Mezibov v. Allen, all three Sixth Circuit judges agreed that Mezibov 
could show no real injury because “a criminal defense attorney of ordinary 
firmness would not have been chilled” by a prosecutor’s public criticism.57 
But they split over the applicability of the First Amendment. Judge Siler 
and Judge Batchelder, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Zal, 
concluded that courtrooms are nonpublic forums and that “we regularly 
countenance the application of even viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions 
on speech.”58 They cited rules of procedure and evidence banning lawyers 
from discussing irrelevant or prejudicial topics during trial.59 This drew 
Judge Moore’s dissent: 
By stating that the First Amendment has no place in the courtroom, the 
majority . . . betrays the historical role of litigation as providing a forum for 
the expression of core political speech, instead relegating attorney speech to 
a level heretofore occupied only by such speech as obscenity and fighting 
words. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Far from seeing the courtroom as a place where the First Amendment 
would “intrude,” I view the courtroom as a place where freedom of 
expression should be embraced and exercised with vigor.60 
Judge Moore was right to be alarmed at entirely exempting 
courtrooms from First Amendment protection. Because courts are not 
stereotypical traditional public fora, and because judges clearly must 
control their courtrooms, it is tempting to rule out any place for the First 
Amendment in courtrooms. But this simplistic approach impairs the central 




54 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) [https://perma.cc/3AYU-Q8T7]. 
55 Mezibov, 411 F.3d at 716. 
56 Id. at 718 (quoting Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th 
Cir. 1985)). 
57 Id. at 715; id. at 726 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the 
majority opinion that Allen’s speech would not “deter a criminal defense attorney of ordinary firmness 
from” advocating for “his or her client”). 
58 Id. at 718. 
59 Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 11; and FED. R. APP. P. 34, 38). 
60 Id. at 724, 726 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
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Association says that a lawyer is “a public citizen having special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.”61 Echoing this sentiment, the 
Supreme Court has described the role of attorneys in a democracy in 
grandiose terms: 
One does not have to inhale the self-adulatory bombast of after-dinner 
speeches to affirm that all the interests of man that are comprised under the 
constitutional guarantees given to “life, liberty and property” are in the 
professional keeping of lawyers. It is a fair characterization of the lawyer’s 
responsibility in our society that he stands “as a shield” . . . in defense of 
right and to ward off wrong.62 
Lawyers play a bedrock role in protecting the values written into our 
constitutional form of government. It is entirely foreseeable that if lawyers 
defend right and prevent wrong in our system of justice, they might 
occasionally ruffle a judge’s feathers or express something that seems 
controversial. In those situations, viewpoint neutral First Amendment 
protection for lawyers only strengthens a courtroom’s “veneer of political 
imperviousness.”63 
IV. THE STRUGGLE FOR NEUTRALITY 
The First Amendment should protect a lawyer’s political speech in a 
courtroom, albeit with considerable restrictions that are necessary for 
courts to perform their adjudicative functions. The best reading of the 
Supreme Court case law in this area sees courts as highly specialized, 
limited public fora. Speech may thus be circumscribed, as the Court said in 
Gentile, but that does not mean that the First Amendment has no place. 
Speech in court is highly regulated by the rules of court procedure, rules of 
evidence, and by the need to maintain order and decorum. But it would go 
too far to say, as some lower court judges have, that free speech stops at the 
courthouse gate.64 By way of illustration, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
defended litigants’ freedom to make arguments in court to which judges 
take offense.65 The Court has clarified that a judge’s desire to maintain 
order must not impede lawyers’ ability to argue for their clients.66 
Because courts are limited public fora, the government (usually in the 
person of the judge) may regulate the form and subject matter of speech in 
 
61 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) [https://perma.cc/35JN-
R7KG]. 
62 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted) [https://perma.cc/V49R-5L65]. 
63 Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 1997). 
64 Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”) [https://perma.cc/LAT8-5T72]. 
65 See In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972) (per curiam); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136 
(1965) [https://perma.cc/KS39-CQXU]; In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962) 
[https://perma.cc/N9CG-2P8U]. These cases have been decided on due process or statutory grounds, but 
they reflect latent free speech values as well. 
66 McConnell, 370 U.S. at 236. 
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courtrooms, but may not discriminate based on viewpoint.67 Considering 
this, the simplest and most defensible way for a court to prevent politically 
provocative symbols from appearing on clothing in court is to prohibit any 
expressive symbol of any kind from being worn by lawyers or court 
personnel. A court could, for example, allow only expression permitted by 
the rules of court. Were this the practice in Las Vegas, prohibiting Black 
Lives Matter pins would be easily defensible against a First Amendment 
challenge. 
But once courts begin to allow some expressive clothing—a breast 
cancer awareness ribbon, or even a symbol of allegiance to an NFL team—
prohibiting a Black Lives Matter pin becomes more problematic as it 
appears to be a form of viewpoint discrimination. If it were to be justified, 
it would likely have to be on the grounds that the slogan “Black Lives 
Matter” is particularly controversial. 
There is some precedent for a controversial speech exception in 
limited public fora, but it is not clear to what extent the Supreme Court 
stands by this exception.68 As a starting point, the idea that controversial 
expression might be subject to special restrictions is inherently problematic 
because the First Amendment exists precisely to protect less popular 
speech, which is more likely to be considered controversial.69 If there is an 
exception for controversial speech, this possibility seems to be commonly 
invoked to restrict political activism by African-Americans, given that the 
case on point involved a restriction on the activities of the NAACP.70 
Nevertheless, recent Supreme Court decisions that protected Christian 
speakers against viewpoint discrimination despite the controversial nature 
of their speech seem to undermine the controversial speech exception.71 In 
one of the Court’s more recent cases involving religious speech, the Court 
explicitly said in dicta that it would be specifically impermissible in a 
limited public forum for a government agency to exclude particular 
 
67 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
68 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (permitting the 
exclusion of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from the 
Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), which solicits donations from federal employees, because the 
exclusion is “reasonable”). 
69 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 
(1991) (summarizing the First Amendment’s strong protection of speech even when society finds the 
expression “offensive or disagreeable” (quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990))) 
[https://perma.cc/ZJ45-5P56]. 
70 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 813 (“We conclude that the Government does not violate the First 
Amendment when it limits participation in the CFC in order to minimize disruption to the federal 
workplace, to ensure the success of the fund-raising effort, or to avoid the appearance of political 
favoritism without regard to the viewpoint of the excluded groups.”). 
71 See also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07, 114–15 (2001) 
(reiterating strict viewpoint neutrality as the rule in limited public fora, without any evident exception 
for controversial viewpoints) [https://perma.cc/4YV9-FNAF]; cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 899 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s “holding 
amounts to a significant reformulation of our viewpoint discrimination precedents and will significantly 
expand access to limited-access forums,” and citing Cornelius as representing a different, earlier 
approach). 
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viewpoints about “racism.”72 This should cause judges to be cautious about 
imposing special restrictions on expression that seems controversial. 
In short, this is dicey territory for a court. In Las Vegas, Judge 
Herndon told Ms. Ballou that he thought the Black Lives Matter pin was an 
attack on the court.73 Offended as he might be, “[j]udges are supposed to be 
[people] of fortitude.”74 They must “guard against confusing offenses to 
their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice.”75 
Moreover, lawyers, especially criminal defense attorneys, are supposed to 
raise issues that may make many people uncomfortable. They are not 
supposed to pretend that all is fine with our system of law enforcement if 
they do not believe that to be the case. 
Clearly, a balance must be struck. Perhaps lawyers may be granted 
more leeway in a hearing in front of a judge, but must be more circumspect 
when standing before a jury.76 Perhaps a judge would be on solid ground to 
disallow an especially large or visually distracting pin. But the Black Lives 
Matter pin that Erika Ballou wore was small and simple, with plain white 
letters on a black background. It attracts attention only because of its 
message, which is critical of police violence and possibly (in Judge 
Herndon’s view) of some judges. And there’s the rub. There is something 
especially unseemly about an elected judge who depends on police support 
in his campaigns singling out a defense attorney’s pin containing a message 
police dislike and ordering it removed. It may have happened in the 
courtroom, but the First Amendment still applies. Black Lives Matter is a 
deliberately provocative movement and message. But a judge should only 
restrict its expression in a manner that does not violate the First 




72 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“Our understanding of the complex and multifaceted nature of 
public discourse has not embraced such a contrived description of the marketplace of ideas. If the topic 
of debate is, for example, racism, then exclusion of several views on that problem is just as offensive to 
the First Amendment as exclusion of only one. It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an 
atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, economic, 
or social viewpoint.”). 
73 Ritter, supra note 1 (“The pin, the judge said, ‘is making a political statement, that, “I wear this 
in protest of how the court is treating minority defendants.”’”). 
74 In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972) (per curiam) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 
(1947) [https://perma.cc/LB9N-CRCP]). 
75 Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958) [https://perma.cc/K6M7-UY3R]). 
76 See Juhl & Ferrara, supra note 5 (noting that Ms. Ballou’s supervisor, Clark County Public 
Defender Phil Kohn, said no one from his office would wear the pin in front of a jury). 
